We examine the role of founders as directors by examining executive compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEO than other firms. Pay for performance sensitivity for non-founder CEOs in founder-director firms is almost twice that of CEOs in non-founder firms. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher. CEOs of founder-director firms are 85% more likely to be replaced than CEOs of non-founder firms for a decline from the top to the bottom decile in performance. However, we do not find any difference in M&A behavior between founder-director and non-founder firms. Finally, directors appear to be more diligent in founderdirector companies. Non-founder directors in founder-director firms have a better board meeting attendance record than in other firms. The evidence that boards in founder-director firms provide more powerful incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average board provides a useful benchmark to measure board performance in U.S. firms. Our findings identify compensation and CEO turnover as two governance mechanisms that may drive the founder value premium documented by prior research.
Introduction
Recent research provides evidence that family firms in the U.S have higher valuations compared to non-family firms. This research also finds that higher valuation is exhibited only in those family firms where the founder is actively involved with the firm (active-founder) i.e., when the founder serves as the Chief Executive Officer (founder-CEO) or as a member of the board of directors with a non-founder CEO (founder-director).
1 These firms have higher valuations compared not only to non-family firms but also to other types of family firms, such as those where the family has equity ownership but no direct managerial role or those where a descendant of the founder is the CEO (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) .
While past research establishes the existence of a founder premium, possible reasons for such a value premium have not yet been explored. In this paper we examine firms with an activefounder and focus on the governance role played by the founder-director. To examine the governance implications of the presence of a founder-director we study three corporate decisions -CEO turnover, CEO compensation, and corporate investment decisions as reflected in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Our choice of these three important board decisions follows Jensen (1993, pp. 862-3) who suggests that "the job of the board is to hire, fire, and compensate the CEO, and to provide high-level counsel." Our analysis helps better understand possible mechanisms that create a founder premium and the monitoring role of the founder.
We find that almost twenty-five percent of large U.S. corporations have their founders actively associated with the company either as the CEO (13%) or as a member of the board of directors (12%). 2 Founder-directors differ from non-founder board members in some crucial 1 Prior literature (for example Andersen and Reeb, 2003) defines family firms in the U.S. as companies where the founder or one or more members of the founders' family (including descendants) is an officer, director, or blockholder. 2 A CEO typically serves on the board as a director of company. However, for expositional clarity we define founder-directors as founders who are only directors with such firms with a non-founder successor CEO. Therefore our founder-director sample is mutually exclusive from the founder-CEO sample.
ways. Their greater firm-specific expertise and higher ownership stakes give founder-directors both the ability and willingness to effectively monitor senior management. They identify closely with the firm and have greater reputational concerns (James 1999). Due to their superior knowledge about the firm they suffer less from information problems (vis-à-vis management) that Jensen (1993) suggests contributes to the lack of board effectiveness. For these reasons, founderdirector companies likely have fewer agency problems and therefore are likely to be better governed than non-founder companies. The presence of a founder-director however, is not unambiguously value enhancing. Founders can be value decreasing if their presence on the board leads to divided loyalties of the employees, second guessing of CEO decisions by the founder (many of whom are former CEOs), and a general lack of independence for the non-founder CEO.
With a founder on the board, successor-CEOs are more likely to cater to the preferences of the founder than to those of the more atomistic investors. On balance though, the empirical evidence seems to weigh in favor of net value enhancement in the presence of a founder-director.
Our sample consists of 11,410 firm-years of U.S companies between 1996-2004 that comprise the S&P 500, S&P Mid Cap 400, and S&P Small Cap 600 companies covered by
Compustat's Execucomp database and Investor Responsibility Research Center's Directors dataset. We first confirm the results from prior research that firms with active founders have higher valuations. We find that firms with active founders (i.e., with founder-CEO or founderdirector) have a Tobin's Q of 0.32 higher than non-founder firms. This valuation premium is driven both by founder-directors and founder-CEOs -the Q of firms with a founder director is about 0.45 higher and that of founder-CEO firms is about 0.25 higher than non-founder firms. 3 Our results suggest that companies with active founders behave differently in all of the three decisions that we examine. Both founder-CEO and founder-director companies exhibit higher CEO pay to performance sensitivity (PPS). Higher PPS in founder-CEO companies is not surprising since founder-CEOs have substantial equity holdings in their companies. Higher PPS in founder-director companies suggests that boards in such companies provide higher powered incentives to their CEOs than other firms in general. Within our sample, for non-founder firms, the average CEO's annual total compensation including the value of stock and option holdings increases by about $5.20 for a $1,000 increase in the market value of the firm. For firms with a founder-director the additional effect on PPS is $5.93 for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth and in founder-CEO firms the additional impact is $18.00 for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. We also confirm the higher PPS result by examining within firm changes in founderdirector status. For firms with a founder-director in at least one of the years in our sample, we find that CEO PPS for the non-founder CEO is lower when the founder is not a director. We also examine the level of pay and observe no difference in the level of total CEO pay between founder-CEOs or non founder CEOs in founder-director firms and CEOs in non-founder firms.
4 CEO replacement decisions are also different in firms with active founders than other firms. We find that founder-CEOs have a statistically significant lower turnover probability. The likelihood of founder-CEOs leaving office is however no different from CEOs in non-founder companies conditional on firm performance. In contrast CEOs of founder-director firms are more likely to be replaced both unconditionally and conditional on poor performance. The magnitude of the change in CEO turnover performance sensitivity in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms is also large. The likelihood of CEO turnover increases by almost 85% in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms for a change from the top to bottom decile in performance. Higher sensitivity of CEO replacement decisions to firm performance suggests that founder-director firms are able to replace firm leadership faster than other firms in the event of poor performance. The higher unconditional rate of turnover can have two explanationseither that boards with founder-directors are better able to identify potential performance problems and replace CEOs before poor performance actually manifests itself or that founderdirectors firms replace CEOs too soon and inefficiently. We study stock returns around CEO turnover announcements to examine which of these explanations may be true. We find that announcement returns are about 5% higher in founder-director firms suggesting that CEO replacement decisions in founder-director firms add more value than on average. Note however the statistical significance of the higher return coefficient is borderline (p-value = .099).
We do not find significant differences in frequency of M&A transactions or M&A announcement returns between founder-director and other firms. We do however find that the announcement returns are 0.9 % higher for founder-CEO firms (t-statistic = 2.12). Finally, our analysis of director attendance at board meetings reveals that the board has a better attendance record in founder-director firms than in other firms. We conjecture that this could be because the presence of founder-directors results in better functioning boards or because founder-directors are able to pick more diligent directors for their companies. The better attendance record provides one direct measure of the effort expended by boards in their monitoring effort and is consistent with our other results documenting better governance in founder-director firms.
Our paper contributes to two major research areas. First, our paper contributes to the literature on the role of founders. We identify potential governance mechanisms that may drive the higher valuations observed for firms with founder involvement. Both founder-CEO and founder-director firms have different CEO compensation and executive turnover policies. The role of the founder thus extends to being a better board level monitor and not just to being a better executive. We also find that the higher PPS and turnover-performance sensitivity can uniquely be attributed to the founder being a director. These effects are not observed when other directors with firm specific experience (prior CEOs) serve on the board and the founder-director effect is incremental to non founder director equity ownership.
Second, our paper contributes to two research streams on corporate governance outcomes in firms -one on executive compensation and the other on CEO turnover by documenting an association between the presence of a founder-director and CEO pay and turnover decisions. To the extent that the presence of a founder-director implies lower level of agency problems in the firm, the evidence suggests that, such boards provide more high powered incentives both through direct compensation and also through retention incentives than boards in other firms.
One concern in the literature on founder-firm premium is potential endogeneityfounders are less likely to leave their firms when the firms have higher valuation. Therefore higher valuations for founder firms may be unsurprising. 5 We do not explicitly try to resolve the endogeniety concern since the premium finding is our point of departure and not the main contribution. 6 However it is possible that founder firms are different from firms without an active-founder and this unobserved difference drives the differences in outcomes that we document. We mitigate such concerns by including in our tests a number of control variables that have been identified in prior research. Moreover endogenity concerns are less worrisome in our context because the unobserved heterogeneity has to explain not only the valuation premium but also the differences in CEO compensation, turnover, and board meeting attendance patterns between founder and non-founder firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior literature and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the data and sample. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence and Section 5 concludes.
Prior research and hypothesis development
2.1 Founders, value premium, and corporate governance Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that combining ownership and control allows controlling owners to forgo profits for control rents. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) support the conjecture that 5 Adams et al., (2005) use an instrumental variables approach and find that the premium results still holds after accounting for these concerns. 6 We are unable to follow the same instrumental variables approach since it is not amenable to our analysis of the effect of founder-directors on the outcomes we examine.
concentrated ownership and control is value destroying. However, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that the presence of large shareholders as achieved by combining ownership and control can also mitigate managerial expropriation. One such large owner is the founder or the founding family that combines large equity ownership with longer ownership horizon, managerial control, and board oversight (James 1999). Recent empirical research finds evidence that family firms have higher valuations compared to non-family firms. 7 Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from 1992 through 1999, Andersen and Reeb (2003) , find that family firms trade at a premium compared to non-family firms. Using data for Fortune 500 firms between 1994 and 2000, Villalonga and Amit (2006) confirm the results of Andersen and Reeb (2003) . But, they find that family firms are value enhancing only when the founder is active in the firm -either as the CEO or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Adams et al. (2005) and Fahlenbrach (2006) also find that while firms with founder-CEOs have higher valuation, those with founder-descendant as CEO have no effect or even a discount in valuation. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that founder descendants serving as CEO have no effect on market performance. Perez-Gonzalez (2001) documents a negative market reaction to news of appointment of heirs as the CEO. We take the above findings of active-founder premium as the point of departure in our study and examine possible governance mechanisms that may drive the higher valuation.
We examine three corporate decisions that can drive this value premium -CEO turnover, CEO compensation, and corporate investment decisions as reflected in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). While we examine both founder-CEOs and founder-directors, our focus is on board monitoring in founder-director firms. It is interesting to examine the differences in corporate decisions between firms with and without a founder-director for two reasons. First, as discussed above, we can shed light on the source of the founder related valuation premium documented in 7 A large number of prior papers have examined the effect of concentrated ownership on firm value in the U.S and internationally (for example Himmelberg et al., 1999 , Claessens et al., 2002 . Our discussion in this section is focused on the papers that specifically examine family firms in the U.S. the literature. Further, the comparison between founder-CEOs and founder-directors contrasts the role of the founder in an executive versus in a monitoring role.
Second, we conjecture that the presence of founder-directors reduces agency problems both between the board and shareholders and between the board and managers. The effectiveness of the board depends on the ability and the willingness of the board to monitor management.
Founder-directors typically have greater ownership stake and a longer investment horizon than the average director. This combined with greater emotional and reputational investment in the firm likely provides a greater willingness to provide advice and oversight (Demsetz and Lehn 1985) . Jensen (1993) attributes the failure of corporate boards partly to information problems between the board and managers. He suggests that since the information flow is controlled by the CEO, even highly talented board members are unable to contribute effectively. Founders have greater firm specific experience and hence greater knowledge of the firm than outside directors (Andersen and Reeb 2003) . Boards with founder directors therefore suffer less from information problems and are likely to be more effective.
Founder-director firms provide an example of firms envisaged in Fama and Jensen (1983) where managerial control is much simplified due to the presence of one or a few concentrated residual claimants with sufficient firm specific knowledge who can ratify and monitor important decisions and set rewards. Therefore, examining the behavior of founder-director firms provides insights on the implications of effective board level governance for corporate decisions. For instance, if the CEO turnover sensitivity to poor performance is higher for CEOs monitored by a board with a founder-director, this may suggest that, on average, other boards (i.e., firms without a founder-director) do not impose adequate retention risk on their CEOs.
CEO Pay for Performance Sensitivity
A large prior literature examines the determinants of pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) of top managers (see Murphy (1999) for a comprehensive review). Agency theory suggests that shareholders can motivate managers to take optimal actions by linking pay to firm performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 9 Hall and Leibman (1998) also point out that the size adjusted Jensen and Murphy sensitivity increases by a factor of 4 as against the almost doubling suggested by the increase from 3.25 to 6. This is because PPS is sensitive to firm size -larger firms have lower PPS and firm size has increased over time.
equity based pay compared to CEOs in non family firms. Ex ante it is not clear how PPS should behave in founder firms. For founder-CEOs, PPS will be mechanically higher since founders typically own a greater fraction of the firm's stock. Therefore their compensation will be more strongly related to returns to shareholders. In founder-director firms a case can be made that managerial actions are more observable to the board since the founder has greater firm specific experience than the average director and is therefore better placed to evaluate managerial actions.
If this is true then PPS in founder-director firms will be less than in other firms. However, if on average the PPS for CEOs is too low compared with the optimal level (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) then PPS for non-founder CEOs in founder-director firms may be higher than for non-founder firms. Better governance can therefore translate into higher PPS. This paper tests this hypothesisto the extent that boards with a founder-director provide better oversight, we would expect founder-director firms to have higher PPS. Our analysis of PPS of non-founder CEOs in founderdirector companies provides a benchmark that can help evaluate compensation practices in U.S.
firms. If CEO PPS is higher in founder-director firms that would support concerns that, on average, U.S. CEO pay is not sufficiently linked to performance.
CEO Turnover Performance Sensitivity
A large body of prior research provides consistent evidence that CEO turnover is inversely related to firm performance. For example, CEO turnover is negatively related to industry adjusted firm stock returns (Fee and Hadlock, 2003) and industry-adjusted accounting earnings (Weisbach, 1988) . Brickley (2003) summarizes this research and concludes that while the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance is statistically significant the economic significance is small. Prior research also documents the association between board characteristics and CEO turnover. These papers find that the turnover performance sensitivity increases when there are more outsiders on the board (Weisbach, 1988) and with greater product market competition (Defond and Park, 1999) and decreases with greater presence of busy Our focus is specifically on the founder's role on the board rather than on family firms. Finally, Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) provide time series evidence that the frequency of forced CEO turnover has increased over the time period . Similarly, Kaplan and Minton (2006) document that the frequency of forced CEO turnover has increased from 1992 to 2004.
We conjecture that founder-directors have greater ability and willingness to monitor senior management. Therefore, we expect boards with founders to make more timely CEO replacement decisions when faced with deteriorating firm performance. Our paper complements existing CEO turnover research by identifying a governance related cross-sectional determinant of performance-turnover sensitivity. More importantly, as noted in the case of PPS, founderdirector boards can provide a benchmark to evaluate the turnover-performance sensitivity for
CEOs of non-founder firms in light of the Brickley (2003) conclusion, that the average economic impact of poor performance on turnover likelihood is too low.
We also examine the market reactions to CEO turnover for our sample firms. Prior research on market reaction to CEO turnover announcements finds mixed evidence. CEO turnover announcements can suggest improved future performance and hence can trigger a positive stock price reaction. On the other hand, Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) conjecture that turnover may also signal that recent firm decisions are unsound and hence may result in a negative market reaction depending on how much investors knew of managements poor performance. Consistent with these mixed predictions, Weisbach (1988) finds a positive stock price reaction to turnover news while Khanna and Poulsen (1995) document the opposite result. 1973 and 1998, acquiring firms experienced a three-day abnormal returns around the M&A announcement date of about -0.6% and the acquirer abnormal returns from twenty days before the announcement to the deal closing date are about -7.5%.
Mergers and acquisitions
The board of directors influences the M&A decision by playing a role in evaluating the CEO's strategic decisions (Jensen, 1993) . Prior research has also shown that the board is often involved in the capital budgeting process (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) . Grinstein and Tolkowsky (2004) find that many boards have explicit committees to review M&A transactions. We examine if founder-directors help firms make better M&A decisions. If the presence of founderdirector on the board implies better monitoring of the M&A process, it could be associated with more efficient M&A decisions and therefore higher announcement returns.
Director attendance
While the three outcomes discussed above -CEO pay, CEO turnover and M&A decisions provide us with our primary measures of director effectiveness, we also examine a direct measure of board diligence and monitoring effort -attendance at board meetings. The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that companies list in their proxy statements the names of directors who attended less than 75 percent of the board and committee meetings in the previous fiscal year. To our knowledge, Adams and Ferreira (2006) is the only large sample study on director attendance at board meetings. Using data between 1996 and 2003, they find that directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings (i.e., fewer directors attend less than 75% of all board meetings) when board meeting fees are higher. The result is surprising since meeting fees (on average roughly $1,000) represent a small fraction of the total wealth of a representative director. We use director attendance rate as a measure of director effort and ask the following question: Is there a difference in directors' monitoring effort between firms with founders and those without?
Sample and variable definitions
We identify founders of companies using several methods and sources. Our starting point (2002) for S&P 500 firms. We match these persons to those in the IRRC dataset and identify if these individuals are present on the board of their companies in our sample period. Finally, we follow the methodology in Milbourn (2003) and identify as founders persons who have been CEO since the founding of the firm. We collect the founding year for all firms from the Field-Ritter dataset of company founding dates, as used in Field and Karpoff (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) .
This provides us with founding dates for about half our sample. We use Hoovers and Mergent databases to identify founding dates for the remaining firms.
CEO compensation data are from the ExecuComp database. ExecuComp provides an identifier indicating the executive that serves as the CEO for the fiscal year. The database also provides partial data on the dates when the person became CEO and when the person left office.
We hand collect information to complete these two data items for our sample period. 10 As discussed in Milbourn (2003) press articles report that the departure are due to previously undisclosed personal or business reasons unrelated to the firm's activities. As discussed in the papers cited above and Weisbach (1988) , this careful classification is necessary since boards rarely explicitly dismiss CEOs from 10 Complete data on the date the person became CEO is also useful in our identification of founder based on whether the person is the CEO from the founding year of the firm. their jobs. CEO turnover caused by mergers and spin-offs are excluded from our turnover analysis.
We use the SDC Platinum database to identify all completed acquisitions by sample firms of private, public, and subsidiary targets from January 1992 to December 2005. Following
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) we select M&A deals that satisfy the following criteria:
(1) the target firm has to be a U.S. firm; (2) the deal value is at least $1million; (3) the percentage stake that the acquirer seeks in the deal is at least 50%; and (4) the deal is completed. Firm specific accounting data are from Compustat and stock return data are from CRSP. Table 1 Panel A presents the summary statistics of our sample firms. About 25% of our firm-years have an active founder (ACTIVE_FOUNDER) serving either as a director or as the CEO. ACTIVE_FOUNDER is an indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm-year has a founder either as the CEO or as a director on the board, and 0 otherwise. Of these about 12% serve as a director in the firm with a non-founder CEO (FDIR) and around 13% serve as the CEO (FCEO).
Variable description and descriptive statistics
18% of the firms have a non-founder past CEO (PAST_CEO) on the board. PAST_CEO, an indicator variable coded as 1 if the board consists of any non-founder director who has served as the CEO in the past, is our proxy for the availability of firm specific experience on the board outside of the founder. Only about 1% of our firms have a non-founder family member as the CEO. This is measured by FAM_CEO, an indicator variable coded as 1 if the non-founder CEO has the same last name as the founder.
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On average, CEOs in our sample are about 58-year old and they have been in the position for about 7 years, as indicated by CEO_AGE and TENURE. Firm age (FIRM_AGE), measured as the number of years since a firm shows up in CRSP monthly file is about 24 (20) years at the 11 We recognize that this methodology misses children and siblings of the founder who may use a different last name but adopt this method for ease of implementation. mean (median) level. The average total annual compensation (TCOMP defined as the sum of total annual compensation, including stock options granted, plus the change in the market value of equity and options the CEO owns at the beginning of the fiscal year) of the CEO is $15.64 million. The median total annual compensation is $4.03 million. The right skewness in total compensation indicated by the difference between the mean and median is a factor in our choice of regression methodology in later tests. We observe a total of 1253 CEO changes in the sampleof these we classify 330 as forced turnovers and the remaining 923 as normal turnovers. These turnover rates are similar to those found in other studies examining our time period (e.g. Jenter and Kanaan, 2006) . The mean of ACOUNT is 0.70, indicating that, on average, our sample firms have about 0.7 M&A deals a year. The mean (median) of ARET, the (-1,1) three-day stock returns around the M&A announcement dates for firms that go on to complete the transaction is 0.24% (0.14%). The mean and median returns are not statistically distinguishable from zero.
In Table 1 Panel B, we present the descriptive statistics and test of differences in means of the variables by firm-founder characteristics. The test of mean differences shows that there are some significant differences in the firm characteristics between founder firms and non-founder firms. Consistent with the founder premium, the mean market-to-book ratios of non-founder firms, founder-director firms, and founder-CEO firms are 1.83, 2.61, and 2.38 respectively and the differences are all statistically significant. Firms with a founder-director tend to be smaller, more R&D oriented, less leveraged, more volatile, as indicated by the significant differences in ASSETS, MVE, RND, LEV, and RET_VOL of founder-directors firms relative to non-founder firms. Not surprisingly, the average firm age of founder-director firms (16.83 years) and founder-CEO firms (12.83 years) is significantly smaller than that of the non-founder firms (27.59 years). This is consistent with founder first serving as CEO of the firm, then as non-CEO director, and finally becoming uninvolved with the firm over time. Total change in annual compensation (TCOMP) for the CEO is higher for founder-CEO firms. This is consistent with the higher equity ownership of founder-CEOs. More interestingly, CEOs of firms with a founder-director also have higher TCOMP. The mean of TNV, the percentage of forced CEO turnover, is 2.69% for nonfounder firms, 5.88% for founder-director firms, and 2.02% for founder-CEO firms. The difference in CEO turnover rates between founder-director firms and other firms is statistically significant. The only statistically significant difference in ARET, the M&A announcement returns, is between for founder-CEO firms (0.81%) and non-founder firms (0.12%). These univariate results suggest that CEO compensation and CEO turnover are different in founder-director firms than in other firms. Our multivariate tests will explore these differences further.
Empirical results

The founder premium
As a starting point, we first confirm the founder premium results identified in prior research (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) . We then provide evidence on the relative effect of the different roles a founder can play in the firm -as the CEO and as a non CEO-director. (1)
for firm j and year t. The dependent variable is measured as the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets -a proxy for Tobin's Q. We follow Anderson and Reeb (2003) and include the following control variables. FIRM_SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of the total assets. Growth opportunities (RND) are measured as the ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. Firm risk (RET_VOL) is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the prior 60 months. Leverage (LEV) is long-term debt divided by total assets.
Firm age (FIRM_AGE) is measured as the natural log of the number of years since the firm shows up on CRSP monthly stock return files. We also control for other board characteristics, including board size (BD_SIZE) and board independence measured as the ratio of independent directors to total directors (BD_INDP), ownership by non-founder directors (DIR_HOLD) and CEO Equity based pay (CEO_OPTINT) measured as the amount of stock options granted divided by total CEO pay. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all the regressions.
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Results in Table 2 column (1) show that there is a positive and significant relation between the presence of an active-founder and Q, suggesting a higher valuation for firms with an active founder. The coefficient on ACTIVE_FOUNDER is 0.32 (t-statistic = 4.06). We decompose the active founder dummy into founder-director (FDIR) and founder-CEO (FCEO) to examine the source of the founder premium. -test) . This suggests that the value added by a founder-director is similar in magnitude to that added by a founder-CEO.
The ability of a director to provide effective monitoring is dependent on both the willingness and the ability to provide oversight. We conjecture that the value added by the founder-director is greater than that by other directors because the founder has greater firm specific experience and is therefore better equipped to provide appropriate oversight holding the willingness to do the job constant. If the value added by the founder is solely due to such firm specific experience, the same can be provided by any person who has served as a CEO in the past (PAST_CEO). We also examine the effect of family members or descendants of the founder serving as CEO using the variable FAM_CEO. Overall, our results confirm the founder premium result in previous studies. In addition we document that the premium is not merely due to prior firm specific experience or due to the equity holdings in the firm. The founder premium seems to arise from the bundle of attributes that exist in the founder due to the founders' unique position in the firm.
Executive compensation in founder firms
We examine pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) in founder firms using the following empirical specification: 
for firm j in year t. In equation (2) above β 1 is the pay-for-performance sensitivity i.e., the change in the CEO's firm-related wealth (TCOMP) for a unit change in firm value (Hall and Leibman, 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a and 1999b; Himmelberg and Hubbard, 2000; and Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora, 2006) . The variable TCOMP is measured as the sum of the following three components: (i) cash compensation which is the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash payouts over the year; (ii) the Black-Scholes value of options granted and the market value of restricted stock granted during the year and other long-term incentive payouts; and (iii) the change over the year in the market value of equity and options held by the CEO at the beginning of the year. Consistent with prior papers cited above we use equity and options held at the beginning of the year to avoid confounding issues related to equity sales and option exercises during the year. ACTIVE_FOUNDER is a dummy variable as defined in the previous section, DMKTVAL is the change in the market value of equity during the fiscal year, and ROA is the return on assets of the firm during the fiscal year.
Extant research suggests that the CEO's pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) is a function of CEO age, firm size, and the volatility of a firm's business and operations. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show that PPS increases with CEO age. Baker and Hall (2000) and Core and
Guay (2001) point out that the CEO's marginal product varies with firm size, and hence PPS may be related to firm size. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) show that PPS decreases with the variance in shareholder dollar returns. We therefore include these variables as control variables in our estimation. Prior papers (Hall and Leibman, 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999 a and 1999 b; Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora, 2006 ; among others) caution that PPS estimation will be influenced by the presence of outliers since some CEOs own a large portions of the firm's stock (for example Bill Gates of Microsoft). Following these studies we estimate equation (2) using median regression techniques. The median is less influenced by the presence of large outliers than the mean since the median regression minimizes the sum of absolute deviations rather than the sum of squared deviations. Moreover, because the median is also a more robust estimate of central tendency than the mean, the precision of estimates from a median regression is also higher. In untabulated sensitivity tests, we re-estimate all regressions using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). We repeat the tests (results not reported) using OLS regressions (after winsorizing at the 1% and 99% level) and also using the robust regression procedure described in
Hall and Leibman (1998). These robustness checks yield inferences similar to the reported median regressions. Table 3 reports the estimation of equation (2) founder CEO likely has greater equity holdings in the firm than the average CEO and, therefore, his/her wealth will be affected more for a given change in firm value.
In column (3), we further include PAST_CEO and FAM_CEO and their interactions with DMKTVAL in the regression. The results show that the implications of FDIR and FCEO for CEO PPS remain similar both economically and statistically. If a founder descendant is serving as the CEO, then he/she is likely to have higher PPS -the coefficient on FAM_CEO * DMKTVAL is 10.38 and is statistically significant. This is not surprising either, because the family members of the founder are also likely to have greater equity holdings in the firm than other CEOs. The coefficient on PAST_CEO * DMKTVAL is negative and significant with a coefficient of -1.17.
This implies that if a firm has a past non-founder CEO serving on the board, the current CEO is likely to have lower pay-performance sensitivity.
To provide a benchmark for evaluating the economic significance of the results, in untabulated results, we find that the average PPS for CEOs in our sample (including founder firms) is 6, i.e., the CEOs annual total compensation increases (decreases) by about $6.00 for a $1,000 increase (decrease) in the market value of the firm. Note that our estimate is very similar to the estimate by Hall and Leibman (1998) . The PPS for CEOs of only non-founder firms is $ 5.2 for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Therefore, it appears that the effect of a founderdirector on the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is economically substantial.
To examine whether the results in Table 3 are driven solely by the cross-sectional variations between firms, we construct two change samples and exploit the within-firm variation in the founder feature. We first construct a sample with firms which have at least one year in our sample period with a founder being a director. This procedure yields a sample size of 2,061 firmyears. The results based on this sample are reported in column (1) of Table 4 . The coefficients on FDIR * DMKTVAL and FCEO * DMKTVAL are both positive and significant. The economic magnitude is similar to that documented in Table 3 for FCEO, and larger for FDIR.
We then further restrict our sample to firms with at least one-year with a founder director and at least one-year without a founder director. This procedure further shrinks our sample to 1,387 firm-years. The founder dummies for this sample mainly exploit the within-firm variations in founder status. The results based on this sample, shown in column (2) of table 4, indicate that FDIR and FCEO are positively and significantly associated with the CEO PPS. The economic magnitude of the coefficients is similar to that in Table 3 . For instance, the coefficient on FDIR*DMKTVAL is 6.62, which is almost the same as the coefficient documented in Table 3 .
The results based on these two within firm change samples confirm our empirical findings based on the larger sample and mitigate the concern that our results are driven by firm characteristics that are correlated with founder status.
Next, we examine the relationship between the level of CEO pay and founder status of the firm. Table 5 presents the regression of TDC1, the amount of total cash compensation plus the fair value of stocks and options granted to the CEO in a fiscal year, on founder status and other determinants of CEO pay following Core et al. (1999) . The results in Table 5 Overall, we find that there is a strong association between CEO PPS and the role of founder in the firm. CEOs who are a founder or member of the founding family have higher PPS.
This result is not surprising, given the typically larger equity holdings of the founder CEO or the CEO from the founder family. We find the higher PPS in founder-director firms to be the more interesting result since it cannot be explained by founder equity ownership. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that boards with founder directors, that we conjecture suffer less from agency problems, provide greater incentive pay for the CEO.
CEO turnover
Next we examine the relationship between CEO turnover -performance sensitivity and the founder status of firms in our sample. Following prior literature we estimate a logit regression using the following specification: 
for firm i in year t. TNV is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a forced CEO turnover in a given year, ACTIVE_FOUNDER is a dummy for active founder, RET is the industry-adjusted stock returns, and ROA is the return on assets for the year. Industry adjustment is done at the twodigit SIC level. 13 The control variables are firm size (MVE) and equity holding by the board (DIR_HOLD) measured as described earlier. Table 6 presents the estimates from the logit regression in equation (3). In column (1) of Table 6 , we interact ACTIVE_FOUNDER with the performance variables (RET and ROA).
Consistent with the expectation that CEOs of firms with poor performance are more likely to be replaced, both RET and ROA are negatively associated with TNV. The coefficient on ACTIVE_FOUNDER * RET is negative and significant (-0.76 with a z-statistic of -2.12).
However, the interaction of ROA with ACTIVE_FOUNDER is not significant. Among the control variables, greater director ownership of the firms stock increases the likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance as seen by the negative and significant coefficient (-0.02 with z-statistic = -2.46) on DIR_HOLD*RET.
Column (2) separates ACTIVE_FOUNDER into founder-director (FDIR) and founder-CEO (FCEO). The coefficient on FDIR * RET is negative and significant (-0.82 with z-statistic of -2.02). This shows that when a firm has a founder-director, the CEO faces a higher turnover pressure when industry adjusted performance is poor. To gauge the economic magnitude of this effect, we calculate the marginal effect of FDIR on CEO turnover performance sensitivity (results not tabulated). Holding all other variables at their mean level, moving the industry-adjusted returns from the bottom decile to the top decile will increase the probability of forced CEO turnover by 3.2% for firms without a founder on the board. For founder firms, moving the 13 The results are robust to Fama-French industry classifications.
industry-adjusted return from the bottom decile to the top decile increases the CEO turnover probability by 5.9% or about 85% higher than that for the non-founder firms. The coefficient on FDIR*ROA is negative but not significant (-0.73 with z-statistic = -0.76). Interestingly, the coefficient on FCEO * RET is positive but statistically insignificant. Founder-CEOs are no more likely to be replaced following poor performance than CEOs of non-founder companies. Finally, in column (3) of table 6, we include PAST_CEO and FAM_CEO and their interactions with the performance variables to the regression. FDIR * RET remains negative and statistically significant. Stock ownership by directors increases CEO turnover sensitivity to poor performance in all the specifications.
Interestingly, we find that coefficient on FCEO is negative and significant indicating that founder-CEOs are less likely to be replaced unconditional on firm performance. On the other hand, the coefficient on FDIR is positive and significant i.e, the likelihood of forced CEO change is higher in founder-director companies even unconditional on firm performance. The higher unconditional rate can arise for two reasons. First, founder-directors may be prone to interfere with the functioning of the CEO and replace them when they are dissatisfied even if this is inefficient from a shareholder perspective. On the other hand, founder-directors may be alert to potential problems and replace the CEO even before such problems manifest themselves as poor realized performance. We label the former the interfering founder hypothesis and the latter the efficient founder hypothesis.
To help sort out the two competing explanations above -the interfering founder or the efficient founder -we examine whether there is a systematic difference in the stock market reaction around the CEO turnover announcement dates between founder firms and non-founder firms. Another motivation for this analysis is that while examining either pay-for-performance sensitivity or turnover performance sensitivity of CEOs, theory or prior literature does not provide us with an expectation for an optimal PPS or optimal CEO turnover rate. As a result, a higher CEO turnover rate even conditional on performance may not necessarily be efficient from a shareholders' perspective.
In Table 7 Overall, we find that the CEO turnover decisions made by boards with a founder-director tend to have a more positive market reaction. While this effect is not statistically significant in all the specifications, the economic magnitude is substantial -the three day return difference is about 5% between founder-director firms and non-founder firms.
Merger and acquisition behavior
We next turn to M&A behavior of active-founder firms. We examine both the acquisition frequency and the acquirer market reaction to the acquisition announcement by active-founder and non-founder firms. Given that prior research has documented that, on average, M&A transactions are value-decreasing for the acquiring firm (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001), we first examine whether founder firms are less likely to make acquisitions. We use two variables to measure acquisition frequency. Following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), we calculate the number of acquisitions per firm-year (ACOUNT). To create a measure of acquisition activity relative to the size of the firm, we follow Fahlenbrach (2006) and calculate the acquisition ratio as the sum of the prices of all acquisitions in each calendar year, divided by the firms' average market capitalization for the first day and last day of the year (i.e., relative acquisition count or RACOUNT). We control for the typical determinants of M&A announcement returns, including the percentage of cash used in the transaction, the volatility of the firms' stock returns and operating performance, and the size of the deal (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001)) using the following specification:
RACOUNT t = β 0 + β 1 FOUNDER j + γ Controls j + industry dummies j + error j , (5)
Our sample firms completed 3,504 acquisitions during the sample period. As seen in Table 1 , the mean of ACOUNT is 0.70, which means that, on average, our sample firms completed 0.7 transactions per year. However, the majority of firms do not complete an M&A transaction in the sample period as indicated by the median value of 0 for ACOUNT. 14 Firms with an active founder tend to make more acquisitions, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on ACTIVE_FOUNDER in column (1) of Table 6 Panel A. In columns (2) and (3), when founder-director and founder-CEO are separated, we see that this effect is mainly due to the founder-CEO i.e, firms with founderCEOs make more acquisitions than those without. The coefficient on FDIR is positive but not statistically significant. However, when RACOUNT is used as the dependent variable, none of the founder variables are significant (columns (4) to (6)). This implies that while founder CEOs make more acquisitions, these are of smaller size relative to their firm size and hence overall the total acquisition amounts are no different from that of non-founder firms. The coefficient estimates of FIRM SIZE indicate that larger firms tend to make more acquisitions, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on ASSETS in columns (1) to (3), when ACOUNT is the dependent variable. But the negative coefficients on ASSETS in columns (4) to (6) where RACOUNT is the dependent variable shows that while large firms make more acquisitions these are smaller in deal size relative to their own firm size.
We next examine the merger and acquisition announcement returns to capture the efficiency of the deal for the acquirer firm using the following specification:
FOUNDER j + γ Firm Controls jk + Industry dummies j + Year dummies t + error jt . (6)
where ARET is the three day (-1.1) announcement returns for the acquirer centered around the deal announcement date. The results from the estimation are presented in Table 8 Panel B. The coefficient on ACTIVE_FOUNDER is positive but not statistically significant (0.6 with t statistic = 1.56). However, decomposing active-director into founder-director and founder-CEO shows acquirer returns for founder-CEO firms are 0.9% higher than that for non founder firms on average (t-statistic = 2.13). The M&A announcement returns for firms with a founder-director are no higher than for non founder firms, with the coefficient on FDIR being 0.23 (t-statistic = 0.59).
The results remain similar in column (3) when PAST_CEO and FAM_CEO are included in the regression. Overall, the evidence suggests that there is no systematic difference in the merger and acquisition efficiency between founder-director and non-founder firms. On the other hand there is some evidence based on announcement returns that founder-CEO firms make better acquisitions on average.
Board attendance in active-founder firms
We have documented some important differences in the CEO compensation and turnover decisions in firms with active founders and how these vary between founder-director and founder-CEO firms. In this section, we examine board meeting attendance -a directly observable action of individual directors, to examine if directors in companies with active-founders behave as if they are more diligent. We ask the question -Is the presence of a founder associated with a better attendance record at board meetings? We consider directors' attendance at board meetings as a proxy for director diligence and effort.
As mentioned before, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that companies list in their proxy statements the names of directors who attended less than 75 percent of the board and committee meetings in the previous fiscal year. These data are available in the IRRC directors dataset described earlier. IRRC provides data on Attendance Problem, which is a dummy variable that is equal to one in a given fiscal year if a firm disclosed in its proxy statement that a director attended fewer than 75% of the meetings he or she was supposed to during that year. The nature of the disclosure constrains us to examine the attendance record in such a dichotomous manner.
Data on the exact attendance record of directors are not publicly available. We merge the IRRC data with directors' fee data available in ExecuComp.
We conduct the analysis at the firm year level. 15 We code a firm as having an attendance problem if one or more directors have a less than 75% attendance rate in a given fiscal year.
Following Adams and Ferreira (2006), we control for the following variables that are possible determinants of directors' attendance in our analysis: DIR_MTG_FEE is the fees that directors receive for attending meetings; DIR_TENURE is the number of years since a director has been a director in a firm computed using the year the person first became director averaged across all 15 We also conduct the analysis at the individual director level in unreported tests -our inferences remain unchanged from those reported for the firm level tests. directors in the firm; OTHERPOS is the average number of director positions held by the firms directors in other firms in the IRRC dataset. DIR_COMP (Director compensation excluding meeting fees) is the sum of the cash annual retainer plus the value of annual share and option.
Stock price at the end of the month of the firm's annual meeting was used as the exercise price of the options as well as to value stock grants. RETIRED is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has at least one retired director. The data requirements shrink our sample to 6,579 firm-years. 
for firm j in year t. In columns (1) to (3) of table 9, we present results when we measure attendance for all the directors (including the founder-director) in a firm-year. In columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is based only on non-founder director attendance rates. The results
show that presence of an ACTIVE_FOUNDER is negatively associated with attendance problem, although this effect is not statistically significant (coefficient = -0.13 with t statistic = -1.20 in column (1) and -0.14 with t statistic = -1.30 in column (4)). Decomposing ACTIVE_FOUNDER into FDIR and FCEO shows that the existence of a founder-director implies a higher attendance rate (i.e., lower attendance problem) for the directors in a firm. This effect holds if we examine the attendance problem of all directors (columns (2) and (3)) or the attendance rates of only nonfounder directors (columns (5) and (6)). For instance, the coefficient on FDIR is -0.78 (t-statistic = -3.43) in column (6). We compute the marginal effect of this coefficient and find that directors in firms with a founder on the board have an 8% lower probability of having attendance problems (attending less than 75% of the board meetings) than the directors of firms without a founder on the board. Interestingly, we do not find a similar relationship for founder-CEO firms.
The evidence of a positive association between the presence of a founder-director and the attendance frequency of other directors in the firm can be interpreted in two ways. First, it may be the case that the founders' presence creates a better functioning board and encourages greater attendance. Alternately founder directors may be better at picking more diligent directors to serve on the board.
Conclusions
In this paper we examine CEO compensation, CEO turnover, M&A transactions, and director attendance at board meetings to explore differences in these corporate governance features between firms with founders active in the firm (active-founders) either as the CEO (founder-CEO) or as a director with a non-founder CEO (founder-director) relative to firms without a founder actively involved with them. Firms with active-founders comprise almost 25%
of the largest public firms in the U.S. This is almost evenly split between those with a founder-CEO and those with a founder-director.
Our evidence suggests that firms with a founder-director tend to have higher CEO payperformance sensitivity and CEOs of these firms face higher turnover pressure related to poor performance. However, we do not find any systematic differences in the M&A behavior between founder firms and non-founder firms. In addition, we find evidence that when firms have a founder on the board, the other (non-founder) directors tend to attend the directors' meetings more frequently. This suggests that founder directors have a role to play in better board functioning. Our evidence indicates better board diligence and effective monitoring when founders serve as directors. Such improved governance can partly explain the higher valuation of founder companies documented by prior research. Given that founder-director firms likely suffer less from agency problems, our results provide a benchmark to evaluate board performance in companies in general. This table presents summary statistics. Panel A presents the summary statistics for all firm-years. Panel B presents the variable means by the firm's founder status. ACTIVE_FOUNDER is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an active founder (serving either as the CEO or as a director) and zero otherwise. FDIR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder on its board (but not as the CEO) and zero otherwise. FCEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder as its current CEO and zero otherwise. PAST_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a non-founder past-CEO on its board and zero otherwise. FAM_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the current CEO is a member of the founder's family and zero otherwise. MTB is the market value of equity plus the book value of total liability divided by the book value of assets. RND is the amount of R&D expenditures divided by the amount of sales. ASSETS is the log of the book value of assets. MVE is the log of the market value of equity. LEV is the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. CEO_AGE is the age of the CEO. FIRM_AGE is the number of years since a firm first appears in the CRSP monthly stock return files. TENURE is the number of years a CEO has been in that position. RET_VOL is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns in the last 60 months. DIR_HOLD is the average percentage of equity ownership of the board members excluding the founder. TCOMP is the sum of (i) cash compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash payouts over the year); (ii) the Black-Scholes value of options granted and the market value of restricted stock granted during the year and other long-term incentive payouts; and (iii) the change over the year in the market value of equity and options held by the CEO at the start of the year. TNV is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is forced CEO change in a given year and 0 otherwise. ACOUNT is the number of acquisitions in a year by a firm. RACOUNT is the sum of the value of all acquisitions in each calendar year, divided by the firms' average market capitalization for the first day and last day of the year. ARET is the M&A announcement returns (in percentage) in the (-1,1) window around the announcement dates. This table presents the regression of Tobin's Q on founder-director dummy and other variables. The dependent variable is MTB, calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value of total liability divided by the book value of assets. ACTIVE_FOUNDER is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an active founder (i.e., serving either as the CEO or as a director) and zero otherwise. FDIR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder on its board (but not as the CEO) and zero otherwise. FCEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder as its current CEO and zero otherwise. PAST_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a non-founder past-CEO on its board and zero otherwise. FAM_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the current CEO is a member of the founder's family and zero otherwise. ASSETS is the logarithm of the book value of assets. RND is the amount of R&D expenditures divided by the amount of sales. RET_VOL is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns in the last 60 months. LEV is the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. FIRM_AGE is the number of years since a firm shows up in the CRSP monthly stock return files. BD_SIZE is the number of board members. BD_INDP is the percentage of independent board members. DIR_HOLD is the average percentage of equity ownership of the board members excluding the founder CEO and founder director. OPTINT is the amount of stock options granted divided by the total annual compensation (including cash salary, bonus, and stock options grant) of the CEO.
All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are clustered at firm level. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. This table presents the median regression of CEO total compensation on change in shareholder wealth, founder-director dummy, and other variables. The dependent variable is TCOMP, calculated as the sum of (i) cash compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash payouts over the year); (ii) the Black-Scholes value of options granted and the market value of restricted stock granted during the year and other long-term incentive payouts; and (iii) the change over the year in the market value of equity and options held by the CEO at the beginning of the year.
DMKTVAL is the change in the market value of equity over the year. ACTIVE_FOUNDER is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an active founder (i.e., serving either as the CEO or as a director) and zero otherwise. FDIR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder on its board (but not as the CEO) and zero otherwise. FCEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder as its current CEO and zero otherwise. PAST_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a non-founder past-CEO on its board and zero otherwise. FAM_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the current CEO is a member of the founder's family and zero otherwise. DIR_HOLD is the average percentage of equity ownership of the board members excluding the founder CEO and founder director. MVE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. RET_VOL is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns in the last 60 months. CEO_AGE is the age of the CEO.
All regressions include 2-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are clustered at firm level. The coefficients are 1000 times the regression coefficient. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. This table presents the median regression of CEO total compensation on change in shareholder wealth, founder-director dummy, and other variables. Column (1) uses the sample of firms with at least one year with a founder on the board in our sample period. Column (2) uses the sample of firms with at least one year with a founder on the board and one year with no founder on the board in our sample period.
The dependent variable is TCOMP, calculated as the sum of (i) cash compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash payouts over the year); (ii) the Black-Scholes value of options granted and the market value of restricted stock granted during the year and other longterm incentive payouts; and (iii) the change over the year in the market value of equity and options held by the CEO at the beginning of the year.
DMKTVAL is the change in the market value of equity over the year. ACTIVE_FOUNDER is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an active founder (i.e., serving either as the CEO or as a director) and zero otherwise. FDIR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder on its board (but not as the CEO) and zero otherwise. FCEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder as its current CEO and zero otherwise. DIR_HOLD is the average percentage of equity ownership of the board members excluding the founder CEO and founder director. MVE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. RET_VOL is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns in the last 60 months. CEO_AGE is the age of the CEO.
All regressions include 2-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are clustered at firm level. The reported coefficients are 1000 times the estimated regression coefficient presented that way for ease of interpretation. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. This table presents the regression of CEO annual flow compensation on founder-director dummy and other variables. The dependent variable is TDC1, calculated as calculated as the sum of (i) cash compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash payouts over the year); and (ii) the Black-Scholes value of options granted and the market value of restricted stock granted during the year and other long-term incentive payouts. ACTIVE_FOUNDER is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an active founder (i.e., serving either as the CEO or as a director) and zero otherwise. FDIR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder on its board (but not as the CEO) and zero otherwise. FCEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder as its current CEO and zero otherwise. PAST_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a non-founder past-CEO on its board and zero otherwise. FAM_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the current CEO is a member of the founder's family and zero otherwise. MVE is the logarithm of the market value of assets. MTB is the market value of the assets divided by the book value of the assets. ROA is the return on assets during the fiscal year. RET is the stock returns of the firm during the fiscal year. ROA_VOL is the standard deviation of ROA calculated using data from the last five years. RET_VOL is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns in the last 60 months.
All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are clustered at firm level. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ACTIVE_FOUNDER is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an active founder (i.e., serving either as the CEO or as a director) and zero otherwise. FDIR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder on its board (but not as the CEO) and zero otherwise. FCEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder as its current CEO and zero otherwise. PAST_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a non-founder past-CEO on its board and zero otherwise. FAM_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the current CEO is a member of the founder's family and zero otherwise. DIR_HOLD is the average percentage of equity ownership of the board members excluding the founder CEO and founder director. MVE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. RET is the 2-digit SIC industry-adjusted returns. ROA is the return on assets. Robust Z-statistics are in the parentheses. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ACTIVE_FOUNDER is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an active founder (i.e., serving either as the CEO or as a director) and zero otherwise. FDIR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder on its board (but not as the CEO) and zero otherwise. FCEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder as its current CEO and zero otherwise. PAST_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a non-founder past-CEO on its board and zero otherwise. FAM_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the current CEO is a member of the founder's family and zero otherwise. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust t-statistics are in the parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is ACOUNT (the number of acquisitions per firmyear). The dependent variable in columns (4) to (6) is RACOUNT (the sum of the prices of all acquisitions in each calendar year, divided by the firms' average market capitalization for the first day and last day of the year).
ACTIVE_FOUNDER is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an active founder (i.e., serving either as the CEO or as a director) and zero otherwise. FDIR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder on its board (but not as the CEO) and zero otherwise. FCEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder as its current CEO and zero otherwise. PAST_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a non-founder past-CEO on its board and zero otherwise. FAM_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the current CEO is a member of the founder's family and zero otherwise.
RND is the amount of R&D expenditures divided by the amount of sales. ASSETS is the logarithm of the book value of assets. LEV is the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets.
All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are clustered at firm level. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The dependent variable is the M&A announcement returns in the (-1,1) windows around the announcement dates.
RND is the amount of R&D expenditures divided by the amount of sales. ASSETS is the logarithm of the book value of assets. LEV is the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. PCT_CASH is the percentage of cash used in the acquisition.
All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are clustered at firm level. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. statement that a director attended fewer than 75% of the meetings he was supposed to during that year) of all the non-founder directors in a firm-year.
DIR_MTG_FEE is the director's meeting fee. DIR_TENURE is the average number of years since a director has been a director in a firm calculated using the beginning year from IRRC for all directors in a firm (in columns (4) to (6), this variable exclude the founder director). OTHERPOS is the mean number of director positions a director takes in other IRRC firms for all directors in a firm (in columns (4) to (6), this variable exclude the founder director). DIR_COMP (Director compensation excluding meeting fees) is the sum of the cash annual retainer plus the value of annual share and option grants. Options were priced following the method in ExecuComp. The stock price at the end of the month of the firm's annual meeting for the exercise price of the options is used to value stock grants. RETIRED is the mean of a director-specific dummy variable that equals to 1 if the proxy indicated that the director retired from his primary occupation for all directors in a firm (in columns (4) to (6), this variable exclude the founder director). The number of observations varies because of missing data. RET is the stock returns in the physical year before the director's meeting. MVE is the logarithm of the market vale of equity. MTB is the market value of the firm's assets divided by its book value. RET_VOL is the return volatility calculated using data from the last 60 months.
